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1.1  Determining the Standard of Living 
Probably the most famous debate on economic change has been that known 
as “the standard of  living debate,” about the impact of  the British industrial 
revolution.’ This debate began among individuals living in those times, contin- 
ues today, and will go on, no doubt, tomorrow. The debate’s vehemence  has 
several distinct sources-the  politics of the British class struggle, comparisons 
of British growth with the pattern of communist economic growth in the twen- 
tieth century, and more general questions of  the attitudes toward society and 
culture that emerged in modern times. 
Given the broad and emotion-laden sweep of the issues in the British case, 
it is perhaps surprising that no such prolonged debate has arisen for most of 
the other nations that developed subsequently. It is not that such debates could 
not have been generated elsewhere, for periods in which dramatic structural 
changes in the economy took place, with the expansion of urbanization  and 
industrialization.  Surely  one  might  anticipate  such  concerns  for  late- 
nineteenth-century  Germany or Japan. Perhaps it has been the earlier dating of 
the “First Industrial Revolution” in Britain, or maybe it was the focus of Marx 
and Engels on this case in their general discussions of the rise of capitalism, 
that made the British case so important a historical issue. For whatever reason, 
the concern with the changing standard of  living has produced an  extensive 
literature, with frequent appeals to various quantitative measures to represent 
economic growth and welfare. While what could be numerically measured was 
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not the exclusive focus of the debate, numbers came to play a critical part in 
the analysis and rhetoric of the issues. 
Other issues related to economic matters have arisen in  some cases-for 
example, debates on the causes of out-migration in Scandinavia and Eastern 
Europe and on the economic and demographic effects of this immigration on 
those already resident in areas such as the United States, Canada, and Austra- 
lia. These, however, seem to focus on narrower issues than does the British 
debate. There have recently been some signs of a debate emerging concerning 
the standard of living among the free population in the United States in col- 
onial times and in the years before the Civil War, but at present it has not gen- 
erated as much heat as has the British  debate.2 This may  be because such a 
controversy would have seemed rather more surprising to residents of  early- 
nineteenth-century New York than to residents of London at that same time. 
The British debate poses two major questions, questions that have also been 
asked in regard to other issues. First, what can be said about changes pertaining 
to the entire national population, normally approached by considering per cap- 
ita income, aggregate national income divided by  the entire population? In 
answering such a question, collections of  data by  earlier scholars have pre- 
sented much  contemporary  information,  although  later  scholars have often 
been able to expand on these  sources and to construct or reconstruct basic 
estimates of economic and demographic variables. Second, what has happened 
to the distribution of rewards (relatively or absolutely) among specific groups 
or individuals within the population? While some depiction of  such patterns 
had been possible earlier, mainly by using measures that apply to specific parts 
of the population, such as real wages, answers to these questions have recently 
been facilitated by the application of the computer to the masses of individual- 
level data available in various public and private archives. 
Many different types of measures have featured in the economic aspect of 
the standard of living debate-national  income and wealth, per capita con- 
sumption, population, per capita income and wealth, consumption of various 
items, real wages, hours of work, mortality rates, heights, and so forth. Argu- 
ments relate to which measure, if any, deserves prominence, or else how best 
to aggregate the diverse constructs to come up with one simple summary num- 
ber. In addition to these material issues, a range of concepts, each difficult to 
quantify, are debated, including relative changes in the rights of men, women, 
and children; expansion or contraction of political freedoms; changes in high- 
brow, middle-brow, and low-brow culture; and advantages and disadvantages 
of living in urban as contrasted with rural  areas. All of these present major 
difficulties in evaluation, either separately or in combination with other mate- 
rial and nonmaterial components of the quality of life.3 
2. See the discussions in Gallman and Wallis (1992). 
3. The many debates on “progress,” long a staple for historians and philosophers, will not be 
entered into, but they do illustrate that difficulty in agreeing on concepts and interpretations is not 
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In this paper I shall not present a description of all the measures used to 
describe economic growth, nor an evaluation of the accuracy and interpretation 
of the broad  set of  measures that have been  used  in debates  on economic 
change. Rather I shall attempt to place the discussion of  some measures and 
indicators of economic change in perspective. In particular, I shall focus on 
two of the basic measures that have recently been used in examining economic 
progress, or its absence, national income estimates and physical measures of 
well-being, particularly heights of individuals. 
1.2  Ideas of Progress 
There have long been debates about the nature and existence of human prog- 
ress over time, as well as about the comparative rankings of different nations 
and of different groups at particular times. These debates have referred to ma- 
terial progress, as well as political progress, cultural progress, and intellectual 
progress, and have been concerned both with the total population in a given 
area and with the  behavior of  specific groups  within  that population.  Such 
comparisons, over time and place, have always been rather difficult to make, 
since it is often difficult to agree on the appropriate question, on the appro- 
priate (conceptual) indicator, and on the best way to go from whatever informa- 
tion is available to the accurate measurement or description of that indicator. 
Moreover, given our customary desire to answer “yes” or “no,” or “good” or 
“bad,” to any question, difficulties may arise when more than one indicator can 
be used, or when they refer to quite different questions. This is particularly so 
when indicators present somewhat different patterns; this generates consider- 
able dissatisfaction with the procedures and leads to a continuing search for 
the one single, unambiguous  measure or concept for evaluation. That there 
may often be different concepts of progress and that any measurement or de- 
scription must be severely limited by what information is available or can be 
applied to the past may, however, mean that for a number of distinct reasons 
any attempt to define one specific, all-purpose indicator is beyond our capacity. 
Within the  sphere of  material changes the choice of measures to be used 
will depend on what information has been  collected and made available by 
past agencies and individuals and how well it can be taken to represent what 
is desired. This need not mean that the measures we utilize are necessarily only 
those prepared in the past, as is shown by the importance of recent historical 
reconstructions of aggregate incomes and wealth and of their distributions. If 
we restricted ourselves to measures prepared in the past by official authorities, 
we would generally be confined to measures of population, foreign trade, gov- 
ernment revenues and expenditures, and national debt. Population censuses on 
of this set of issues can be found in Lasch (1991).  For a broad discussion of  “the idea of progress” 
by a leading economic historian, see Pollard (1968). 20  Stanley L. Engerman 
a continuing basis began in  the  nineteenth century, in  1790 for the United 
States. Despite  the late-seventeenth-century  emergence of  a concept of  na- 
tional income, official governmental preparation of this measure did not begin 
until the  1930s. It is not usually true that contemporaries or earlier scholars 
prepared better estimates of economic variables than have subsequent scholars, 
as seen, for example, in the eighteenth-century debate on whether the popula- 
tion of  England had increased or decreased, and also in the related debate be- 
tween Hume and Wallace on the trend in population between the ancient and 
the modem  world^.^ There are, of course, many fragments of incomplete data 
that have been used in examining changes in the past. These were often in the 
nature of partial indicators that are believed to be related to broader aggregates 
of  interest, and which might serve as a proxy for the desired measure. Thus, 
for example, the earlier used measures of specie stocks and flows, of imports 
and exports, of urbanization, of nonagricultural workers,  and so forth, were 
intended to serve as indexes of broader income measures, based either on theo- 
retical arguments about economic relationships or else on some currently ad- 
vocated empirical relationship with economic growth. 
1.3  Early Measures of Economic Progress 
It is perhaps not  surprising, given the paucity  of  early data on aggregate 
economic variables, that most early measures of growth were based on physi- 
cal concepts. In the eighteenth century population was seen as the primary 
measure of economic and social progress. This was stated rather concisely by 
David Hume: “But, if  every thing be equal, it seems natural  to expect, that, 
wherever there are most happiness and virtue,  and wisest  institutions, there 
will be the most pe~ple.”~  “The principle that Hume states here . . .  was widely 
held in the seventeenth  and eighteenth century” (Eugene F.  Miller in Hume 
1985,382).  Hume’s debate with Wallace concerning the relative size of popula- 
tions in the ancient and the modern worlds was premised on the contention 
that larger populations were a sign of human betterment. Thus the debate on 
numbers  reflected  an  analysis  of  the  moral  and  philosophical  question  of 
whether mankind had or had not progressed. Hume had proposed some other 
physical indicators for determining whether this was a “flourishing age of the 
world,” including “stature and force of  body, length of  life,” but argued that 
they were “in all ages, pretty  much the same.” They would be expected to 
change too slowly in the period for which there was a historical record (Hume 
1985,387-88). 
4. For the eighteenth-century debate on the trend in English population, see Price (1780), How- 
lett (1968), and Young (1967). Price based his argument on the use of excise tax collections, home 
building, house counts, and bills of mortality. The arguments for an eighteenth-century population 
decline did not convince, among others, Smith (1976,344). For more recent discussions, see Glass 
(1973, 11-89),  Bonar (1966), and Pearson (1978, 370-421). 
5. See Hume’s “Of  the Populousness of Ancient Nations,” in Hume (1985). The quotation is 
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While Hume discussed the relationship between economic growth and pop- 
ulation, other writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries used other 
physical measures to depict changes over time. In England, in the debate on 
progress versus decay (“moderns versus ancients”), advocates drew on indica- 
tors of height and life expectation, as well as population size, in making their 
argumenk6  While little in the way of acceptable empirical evidence could be 
presented, one of the major participants  in these debates, George Hakewill 
(1630,  198-99,  203-8),  argued for the use  of  evidence  from  the sizes of, 
among other things, armor, beds, doors, altars, and seats and suggested the use 
of “bones dug up” to indicate changes in stature over time.7 
The use of population as a proxy for economic progress was frequent in the 
mercantilist literature, where population  growth was also seen as a way  to 
achieve national power (Schumpeter 1954,251; see also United Nations 1973, 
1  :35-37).  Similarly, the early classical economists, including Adam Smith, ar- 
gued that “what encourages the progress of population and improvement, en- 
courages that of  real wealth and greatness” (Smith 1976, 566). Even though 
Malthus pointed to the negative aspects of population growth, he notes that 
“favourable circumstances” in the English North American colonies, economi- 
cally and politically, led to a population that had “a rapidity of increase proba- 
bly without parallel in history” (Malthus 1970, 105).  As long as the resources 
were there, population could increase without adding to human misery. Under 
different circumstances, however, a larger population would lead to difficul- 
ties. This set of  differences made the use of population  size as an index of 
progress more limited, even at a time when more reliable numbers on the sizes 
of populations were, for the first time, becoming available. 
Although the size or rate of  growth of  population by itself is now seldom 
used as an indicator of economic progress, it has frequently been used as part 
of the definition used to determine the presence of economic growth. Kuznets’s 
primary definition of economic growth, based on the observed pattern of mod- 
ern economic growth, is that of a sustained rise in per capita output accompa- 
nied by a sustained rise in population (see, e.g., Kuznets 1966, 19-20).*  Such 
a concern with population increase referred mainly to questions about the in- 
terpretation of the economic performance of Ireland, whose quite rapid post- 
famine growth in per capita income had been preceded, or perhaps caused, by 
6. For summaries of these debates, see Jones (1961), Harris (1949), and Spadafora (1990.21- 
84). The last book also includes much of interest for England and Scotland for the entire eigh- 
teenth century 
7. Hakewill’s third book (1630, 154-286)  in this work deals with “the pretended decay of man- 
kinde in regard to age and duration, of strength and stature, of arts and wits.” Various of the Greek 
and Roman historians did mention heights, life expectation, and relative population sizes, but these 
were not generally used as the basis for arguments about changes over time. The preparation of 
life tables by Halley (1942,6) led him to argue that these tables “give a more just Idea of the Srate 
and Condition of Mankind than anything yet extant that I know of.” 
8. Kuznets (1965, 6, 10) also argued that since “a combination of secular stagnation or decline 
of population with a sustained rise in per capita product has been observed only rarely in the last 
two centuries,” these nations lack the common experience of modem economic growth that would 
help in drawing meaningful generalizations. See also United Nations (1973, 1:505-19). 22  Stanley L. Engerman 
population decline due to high mortality, reduced fertility, and extensive out- 
migration (Kuznets 1959, 20-21).9 There are, however, several historiographic 
antecedents  that remain  of  relevance,  where population  changes  may  have 
meant that total income and per capita income moved in different directions. 
The debate on the economic circumstances of the Renaissance relates to its 
actual economic conditions in a time of apparent population decline, with the 
otherwise relatively limited economic data suggesting little increase in aggre- 
gate income.’O R. A. Bridbury’s depiction of the Black Death as the Marshall 
Plan of the Middle Ages may seem rather severe, but it does raise an important 
historical question-Were  the deaths in the fourteenth century due to exoge- 
nously caused diseases or  were they the endogenous economic outcome of 
prior  rapid  expansion  of  population  beyond  the  capacity  of  England’s re- 
sources?1’  Further, the interpretation of the settlement of the New World could 
look quite different if we begin with Native American GNP in 1491 and make 
explicit allowance for the overall population declines after the arrival of  Co- 
lumbus. The interpretation of  this decline might vary depending on whether 
these demographic patterns were attributed primarily to disease, to warfare, or 
to other factors.12 
In addition to population, other physical measures were used as indicators of 
past economic progress, both by contemporaries and by subsequent scholars. 
Macaulay, in his depiction of  British economic growth written at the end of 
the industrial revolution, discusses population growth and notes several other 
favorable indicators, including decreased mortality and greater life expecta- 
tion, and increased real wages (Macaulay 1849, chap. 3). Contemporaries often 
pointed to the comparative heights in different countries as indicators of differ- 
ential welfare  and living  standards.I3 Some comparisons  of  military  height 
standards over time, to indicate deterioration  in living standards among the 
9. See also Mokyr (1983) for a description and analysis of the causes and consequences of the 
Irish Famine. 
10. See, e.g., the selections from Robert S.  Lopez and Hans Baron in Dannenfeldt (1959);  Lopez 
(in Dannenfeldt 1959, 50) commented in regard to interpretations linking artistic and economic 
flourishings that “the notion that wherever there was  an economic peak we  must also find an 
intellectual peak, and vice versa, has long enjoyed the unquestioned authority of  mathematical pos- 
tulate.” 
11. “For the survivors, the fourteenth-century famines were, no doubt, on personal grounds, 
inexpressibly grievous. But they unlocked a cornucopia. England was given a sort of Marshall Aid 
on a stupendous scale” (Bridbury  1962, 91). Postan (1966, 565-70)  argued that increased real 
wages in England in the fourteenth century reflect the decline in labor supply and population due 
to increased mortality.  The issue posed by endogeneity or exogeneity of population change remains 
central to many discussions of the welfare significance of changes in per capita incomes. 
12. It probably took more than three centuries before the population of the Americas reachieved 
the pre-Columbian level. This also raises another issue concerning estimates where there may 
be explicit or implicit disagreement as to the specific groups whose welfare is considered to be 
appropriately evaluated. This arises also in the appropriate definition of  national income in a soci- 
ety with slavery, and of how to balance free and slave height changes in such societies. 
13. See, e.g., some of  the descriptions regarding the Americas in  Gerbi (1973, 5-6,  53-56, 
82-86,240-45,508-11).  This debate included evaluations not only of relative human heights but 
also the sizes of  animals and plants. 23  The Standard of Living Debate in International Perspective 
lower classes in Europe in  the nineteenth  century, were presented  by  Karl 
Max, quoting the work of J. von Liebig (Marx 1906, 264; see also pp. 221, 
434).14 Estimates of mortality and life expectation had been, as noted earlier, 
proposed quite early as central measures of human welfare. More recent dis- 
cussions by  Sen and others have suggested that mortality data can be used to 
analyze economic performance, and life expectation has become a key compo- 
nent in the composite indices of welfare and the quality of life prepared by 
Moms D. Moms and by the World Bank.15 
1.4  Estimating National Income 
The list of  social and economic indicators that have been utilized as mea- 
sures of, or proxies for, economic growth seems almost unlimited, constrained 
only by what numbers are available and the imagination of the investigator. It 
is often unclear exactly what these measures are intended to demonstrate and 
how to interpret them. In some cases, they seem to be meant as direct indica- 
tors of the concept (whether related only to a specific economic sector or as a 
useful indicator to be applied more generally). In other cases, they seem meant 
primarily as proxies related to the concept used because of the absence of an 
appropriate direct measure, while at still other times they are apparently part 
of some theory of either the causes or the consequences of economic change. 
Early discussions included, in addition to population estimates, exports (and 
their components), imports (and their components), shipping, public debt, spe- 
cie supply, and urban population, while later the more frequently added vari- 
ables included steel production, railroad miles, freight car loadings, percentage 
literate, and occupational structure.’” Extrapolations were sometimes made on 
the basis of regional tax collections, particularly those on real estate, or from 
housing counts. Wealth in real and personal property was often made the basis 
14. Von Liebig had noted that “in general and within certain limits, exceeding the medium size 
of their kind, is evidence of the prosperity of organic beings. As to man, his bodily height lessens 
if his due growth is interfered with, either by physical or social conditions.” 
15. See Sen (1993), Moms (1979), and United Nations Development Programme (1994). For 
discussions of the relation of mortality to per capita income, see, among others, Preston (1975) 
and Kunitz and Engerman (1992). For an interesting examination of “Expectation of Life as an 
Index of Social Progress,” see Hart  and Hertz (1944). Of course, not all additional years of life 
may yield positive utility, as suggested by the Greek myth of Aurora and Tithonus, in which Aurora 
requests “eternal life” but, unfortunately, not “eternal youth” for Tithonus. Or, as the Indian philos- 
opher quoted in Plutarch’s chapter on Alexander responded to the question “How long is it good 
for a man to live?’--“So  long as he does not regard death as better than life.” 
16. Smithies (1946, 68) described an interesting sidelight to the Dawes negotiations regarding 
German reparations after World War I. It was argued that the burden should be proportional to 
national income, but since national income was regarded as an ambiguous number, they utilized 
a “prosperity index,” based on “combining indexes of  total exports and imports, revenues and 
expenditures of the federal and chief state governments, tonnage carried by  the railroads, con- 
sumption of  sugar, tobacco, beer, and liquor, population, and per capita consumption of  coal.” 
Writing in  1949, Smithies stated his belief that given the greater availability of “statistical mate- 
rial” (69), national income will now more frequently be used for such international arrangements. 24  Stanley L. Engerman 
of interregional comparisons, when such data were collected, as in the United 
States between 1850 and 1870. Various measures of outputs and inputs based 
on U.S. census collections of production data after 1840 were made central to 
contemporary discussions, particularly those comparing the North and South 
in  the  antebellum United  States. This discussion  led to  several antebellum 
preparations of  national income estimates, two of which have been deemed 
reasonably respectable (see Gallman 1961). A most imaginative measure was 
proposed by John Clapham, based on the quality of rags, but it is not clear that 
he ever systematically pursued this analysis.” 
Most of us have been raised with the measure of national income per capita 
as the central concept for determining and measuring economic progress, and 
with the use of distributions of individual or family incomes as the basis for 
evaluating relative changes in economic well-being over time. These measures 
are derived, ultimately, from production and demographic data. The broader 
the extent of  governmental  and private data collection, the less the need for 
interpolation or extrapolation, and the more reliable will seem the resulting 
estimates. Nevertheless, many issues of inclusion and exclusion of items per- 
sist. Even with the attempts at standardization of definition and with its prepa- 
ration by various governmental and international agencies, differences remain 
in what, precisely, is being measured as national income. Even if there could 
be agreement on the precise nature of the measure, the translation from specific 
amounts of goods and services to a belief in what this measure might represent 
for human welfare remains uncertain. 
Standardized preparation by governments of national income accounts was 
in most cases a product of the depression of the 1930s, when the interest was 
in determining for policy purposes the magnitude of the economic problem, 
and of World War 11, when the need for large-scale planning made knowledge 
of the scope and nature of the broad economy vital. Otherwise, it was a product 
of the post-World  War I1 concern with aiding the growth of the then underde- 
veloped nations. The timing of  national income preparation reflects also the 
dominance at the time of Keynesian approaches to macroeconomic policy and 
measurement. These various considerations, and their changing nature, have 
had a significant impact on the construction of  national income accounts, in- 
fluencing choices as to what to include and what to exclude, and the choice of 
what particular breakdowns of the national income total should be used. Prior 
to these governmental attempts, however, there had been numerous estimates 
of national income prepared by individual observers in several countries, and 
for various reasons, frequently to determine relative national power. Paul Stu- 
denski’s (1958) study of the history of the income of nations presents a rela- 
17. He claimed that “this is a sure test; for prosperous nations and classes throw away  their 
clothes early” (Clapham 1961,406-7). He did make some rough comparisons, claiming that “En- 
glish specialists noted, in the ten years before the war [World War I], that German rags were not 
quite so good as they used to be,” and “the best rags on the market are American and Canadian; 
the worst Italian and Greek.” 25  The Standard of Living Debate in International Perspective 
tively full description of  those pre-twentieth-century income estimates pre- 
pared  by  authors in  England, France, Russia, the  United  States, Austria, 
Germany, Australia, Switzerland, Greece, India, Italy, and Norway, generally 
based on census and tax records, although several, particularly those before 
the nineteenth century, were based on imaginative constructions from quite 
limited partial data.’* 
The first estimate of national income, as opposed to national wealth, is gen- 
erally attributed to William Petty, in 1665, although these estimates were not 
published until a quarter-century later (Petty 1899, 98-120).19  More familiar 
to most, given their frequent appearance as a demographic and economic start- 
ing point for the study of modem British economic and social history, are the 
estimates of  Gregory King for the year 1688. First published in 1696 and in- 
fluenced, according to Studenski, by the writings of Petty, King’s (1936) esti- 
mates rested primarily on information from various taxes, although other data 
sources were also employed.” Two innovations were made by King: (1) a com- 
parison of years between 1688 and 1695 to see what the effects of  England’s 
wars had been and (2) a comparison of  the per capita incomes of  England, 
France, and Holland. There were several other calculations of  a national in- 
come total for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England (Studenski 1958, 
101-19;  Deane  1956, 1957). In  addition to those by  King, Studenski (1958, 
140-41)  also described two pre-1900 estimates of comparative per capita na- 
tional incomes. Leone Levi’s (1  860) brief and unexplained comparison of Eng- 
18. Studenski also provided a review of the various debates and disagreements on the concept 
of national income and how it is to be measured. Another rather complete discussion of issues and 
problems is to be found in the  pioneering work of Simon Kuznets, most explicitly, in Kuznets 
(1 941). Many of the volumes in the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth series contain 
important conceptual and practical discussions of the measurement of national income. Of particu- 
lar interest  are  volume 20.  Problems  in  the International  Comparison  of  Economic Accounts 
(1957). particularly Kendrick’s introduction and Kravis’s essay, with comments by  Jacob Viner, 
and volume 22. A Critique of the United States Income and Product Accounts (1958), particularly 
Jaszi’s opening essay and Easterlin’s comments. Also of  interest are Clark (1957) and Rostow 
(1990, 209-22).  Other surveys of the background of  national income accounting are Kendrick 
(l972), Carson (1975). and Steckel(l992);  the last also examined the use of heights as a measure 
of changing living standards. 
19. The title of this essay is “Verbum Sapienti.” See also “Political Arithmetick” (Petty 1899, 
232-313),  probably completed in  1676 but not published until  1690. Petty also computed “the 
value of the People,” the capitalized value of the stock of human capital; made comparisons of the 
economic conditions of Holland, England, France, Scotland, and Ireland; and in “The Political 
Anatomy of Ireland,” written in 1672 and published in  1691, noted that “for their Shape, Stature, 
Colour, and Complexion, I see nothing in them  inferior to other People” (201). In describing 
policies for the Irish he argued that “their Lazing seems to me to proceed rather from want of 
Employment and Encouragement to Work” than from any natural factors. See Kiker (1968, 1-4) 
for a discussion of Petty’s concept of  human capital. 
20. See Studenski (1958, 30-37)  and Deane (1955). For another discussion of Petty and King 
(as well as of  contemporaneous estimates of  mortality and life expectation), see Pearson (1978). 
Pearson included a rather interesting 1796 calculation by the mathematician Lagrange, based on 
some material collected by  the chemist Lavoisier, to attempt to determine whether France was 
self-sufficient in  food during the wars (628-35).  See also Studenski (1958, 68-75).  For a broad 
view of the early development of “statistics as a social science,” see Porter (1986, 17-39). 26  Stanley L. Engerman 
land, France, Russia, and Austria indicated that England had by far the highest 
income.*’ Michael Mulhall, in his 1899  Dictionary of Statistics, one of his very 
imaginative collections of data and calculations, presented, for 1885, per capita 
income estimates for 14 European countries, plus the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and Argentina.2Z  In the United States, Ezra Seaman, in  1852, pre- 
sented comparative data on per capita incomes in France, the Netherlands, and 
England and Wales, as well as the United States, with the English having the 
highest income.23 
The concept of national income and its usefulness have thus long been rec- 
ognized and discussed, but it was only with the basic work of Simon Kuznets 
that a more theoretical as well as empirical basis of estimation was applied to 
the measurement of national income. There were, of course, others working on 
these issues in the United States and elsewhere. Occasional early estimates had 
been conceptually more sophisticated than most customary estimates of  the 
times, such as those by Seaman in the United States and by Timothy Coughlan 
inAu~tralia.*~  No earlier estimates anywhere, however, were as detailed, system- 
atic, and analytical as they were in the works of Kuznets, once he turned to the 
estimation of national income in the United States during the interwar period.25 
The basic question of what should or should not be included in national 
income poses many problems, and it is often extremely difficult to be consis- 
tent, particularly if one wishes to relate national  income to welfare.26 Some 
activities that occur in the market are generally excluded, if they are illegal and 
if  legality  is considered among the criteria for inclusion in national income. 
21. Such calculations do not seem to appear in  some of  his subsequent work, such as Levi 
(1880). Levi (1885,25-27), drawing on the British Academy of Social Sciences studies of height, 
suggested the use of  such measures for determining changes in well-being but commented that 
“there is no reliable evidence of the physique of the people at any distinct period.” He pointed to 
the 1882 report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, “which will afford a 
useful standard whereby to compare their future progress,’’ but since “no such observations were 
made before” there are no “reliable data” for current comparisons. 
22. Mulhall (1899, 320). The United Kingdom had the highest European income but lagged 
behind the United States and Australia. Mulhall briefly described the underlying basis of his calcu- 
lations, based on census data for the various countries. 
23. Seaman (1852, 41 8-68).  In addition to contemporary data drawn from “official valuations 
made by government officers in detail .  . .  for purposes of taxation” (439), Seaman gives estimates 
for the three European countries going back to 1200, “taking into consideration the present condi- 
tion and productive industry of Mexico and South America” (438-39). 
24. On Seaman, see Gallman (1961). On Coughlan, see Studenski (1958, 135-37)  and Snooks 
(1993, 143-50;  1994, 152-54).  While both provided some brief explanations of the specifics of 
measurement and understood the distinction between gross output and value-added, neither went 
into much detail on either concepts or measurement. 
25. For some background to the political aspects of the US.  government’s adoption of national 
income accounts, see Perlman (1987). 
26. For some, among many, useful discussions of the relation between measured income and 
welfare, in addition to those by  Kuznets, see Abramovitz (1959, 1989), Denison (1971). Usher 
(1968, 1980), and Pigou (1929). For some broad economic discussions of the meaning of welfare, 
see also Scitovsky (1976). Hirsch (1978), and Zolotas (1 98  I). An important extension of conven- 
tional national income accounts is Eisner (1989). See also Kendrick (1976) for the measurement 
of a broader definition of capital, and the discussion by Engerman and Rosen (1980). 27  The Standard of Living Debate in International Perspective 
The debate on the Smithian conception,  adopted by marxists,  of  restricting 
consideration  to material production  is quite familiar but can probably now 
be considered  resolved (see Studenski 1958, 18 1-88).  Restriction to market 
transactions, however it might be considered desirable, is difficult, particularly 
since changes in economic structure will affect the extent to which various 
activities are performed in the market.*’ Those variations in the locus of family 
and individual activity that have taken place, whether related to the process of 
economic change or due to other factors, have long been the source of contro- 
versy in using national income accounts.  Some of these problems  could be 
solved by imputations of value, based on actual or hypothetical market transac- 
tions, but a large area of disagreement will no doubt remain. 
Among the major disputes about national income accounting is that con- 
cerning the value of the spouse’s time in the household, and the contribution 
of cooking, cleaning, child care, and so forth, to measured output.28  At present 
this work time is not included in national income, reflecting in part the devel- 
opment of  systematic  national  income accounting  in  the  depression  of  the 
193Os, although the argument for its inclusion has long been known and earlier 
calculations made (Kuznets 1941, 432-33;  Studenski  1958, 177-78).29 A. C. 
Pigou’s 1920 remark that “if a man marries his housekeeper  or his cook, the 
national dividend is diminished,” presents  a frequently  discussed  “paradox” 
(Pigou  1929, 32-33).30 Ten years  earlier,  Philip Wicksteed  posed  a related 
problem, combined with what he regarded as the difficulties posed by “inher- 
ently vicious activities”: 
The “services” for which the wages of shame are paid constitute a part of 
the national revenue as much as any other; but if Portia is Brutus’s wife and 
not his harlot her companionship ceases to count in the national revenue. 
And, moreover, any changes in the tastes, habits, or morals of the commu- 
nity which enabled them to derive increased enjoyment from their own per- 
sonal activities or their mutual intercourse would tell for nothing in the esti- 
mates of national wealth. (1910, 651) 
27. See the discussion in Kuznets (1953, 192-252). 
28.  See, e.g., Folbre and Abel (1989) and Folbre and Wagman (1993), and  the works cited 
therein, as well as Snooks (1994). This debate goes back to quite early in the preparation of na- 
tional income accounts, as seen in the writings of  Seaman (1 846) and W.  I. King (1969). King 
(1969, 133-35)  noted the role of value-added by  housewives, which when shifted to the factory 
raised income as measured, in addition to the problems due to the “disappearance” of free goods. 
Solomon Fabricant’s introduction to this volume is quite useful. 
29. Kuznets’s estimate for 1929 was that housewives’ services were about one-fourth of total 
national income, in reasonable approximation to the estimates made by  Snooks for Australia and 
Folbre and  Wagman for the United States. Ezra Seaman (1846, 305) spoke of  adding various 
services, including “ordinary domestic labour” to estimated income, and this treatment of  all ser- 
vices raised income by about one-third. In 1852,  however, he excluded from the “rank of produc- 
tive industry, housekeeping, the labor of domestic servants,” and other services, on the basis that 
they are not material products. 
30. Similarly, Pigou notes that if a woman leaves “factory work or paid home-work to unpaid 
home-work,” the national dividend also, paradoxically, falls. 28  Stanley L. Engerman 
Various estimates of the value of a housewife’s time using wages in domestic 
service and other measures had been made by those preparing earlier national 
income accounts, including Kuznets, but these were made primarily for illus- 
trative purposes and were not included in the basic estimates of national in- 
come, which were generally restricted to transactions in the market.3’ Since 
the national accounts do not impose any breakdown of consumption within the 
home and the family  unit  itself,  no division  relating  to  the importance of 
changes between  spouses is estimated. The present treatment  of household 
production is not intended to answer questions concerning changes in the rela- 
tive benefits and costs to the different spouses. Not all of the gross output in 
the household is omitted from national income, however, only the amount of 
value-added by the labor within the household. As Robert Gallman (1966) 
pointed out, the basic raw  materials going to household production of food, 
clothing, and so forth, are already included as part of national income.32 
In considering the family  unit  there are other issues of  imputations  that 
might be raised. If children are regarded as the outcome of a choice that could 
have led to more leisure or more parental consumption, is it appropriate to 
ignore the utility provided to parents in excess of the costs of  a child’s con- 
sumption of market goods? If children are desired, should the more appropriate 
denominator of the national income calculation be per family rather than per 
capita? Can we attribute an effect on imputed income of the fertility decline in 
the demographic transition, due either to changed demand for numbers of chil- 
dren or for “quality-adjusted” children, whether or not these are regarded as 
reflecting a change in tastes? And how will such an adjustment influence the 
measure of economic growth in recent times? 
Some types of imputations for nonmarket consumption are considerably less 
controversial and are conceptually and empirically easier to make, as they can 
be based on market prices for closely related items that are subject to frequent 
transactions. These include imputations for food grown and consumed on a 
farm, without entering the market,  and for owner-occupied housing,  which 
does not involve a market transaction for its periodic rental. 
Other forms of imputations, since they are not strictly based on market ex- 
change, present more complex problems. Among the concomitants of modern 
31. Indeed, the first set of national income accounts that also provided an estimate for the value 
of housewife services, by  Mitchell et al. (1921, 57-60,  67). placed it at equal to about 25-31 
percent of  measured national income. A  detailed worldwide survey of  the estimated value of 
housewife services, by  Goldschmidt-Clermont (1982), has almost all values falling within the 
range of 20-40  percent of national income or GNP. 
For an analysis of the 1890  census adjusting female labor force participation for boarding house- 
keepers, unpaid agricultural family farm workers, and some manufacturing workers, see Goldin 
(1990.42-55.219-27).  She estimated that “the inclusion of these activities increases the participa- 
tion rate of married women across the entire economy by about 10 percentage points.” 
For a different approach to the evaluation of housewife’s services, based on nineteenth-century 
legal cases, see Segal(l994). 
32. There may, of course, be some disagreement about how to value this labor time, depending 
on whether alternative uses of labor were available. 29  The Standard of Living Debate in International Perspective 
economic growth has been a reduction in the time worked per surviving capita, 
with fewer hours per day, days per year, and years per lifetime worked. There 
have been  several attempts to value this leisure, on the presumption that its 
increase has been voluntary and not involuntary. At the margin, the value of 
voluntary leisure would be evaluated at the wage rate, while the value to be 
placed on involuntary leisure is less obvious. A similar outcome for the mea- 
sure of growth could be obtained by shifting from output per capita to output 
per man-hour. Familiar estimates of the value of increased leisure, by Kuznets 
(1952) for 1869-1948  and by Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) for 1929-65, demon- 
strate the great impact this adjustment has on measured con~umption.~~  Simi- 
larly influential, but with somewhat more complexity, is the consumption value 
of  increased life expectation, first proposed by  Dan Usher and estimated by 
Usher for Canada and several other countries and by Jeffrey Williamson  for 
Britain  (Usher  1980, 223-57;  Williamson  1984). These provide,  in  effect, 
composite measures of goods and services output and life expectation, with 
their own particular  set of weights, at least to the extent that increased life 
expectation was not attributed to increases in measured consumption. (Presum- 
ably, if utility or market gain could be applied to height, the same procedure 
could be tried.) 
Another set of suggested imputations requires the use of hedonic price re- 
gressions to obtain appropriate “prices,” since no adequate direct analogue can 
be provided in the market. Noteworthy here is the analysis of the costs of the 
“dark satanic mills” of England conducted by Williamson (198 1) on the basis 
of a regression of the argued for disutility-causing aspects of urban life-mor- 
tality and density.34  Possible offsetting gains from urban  residence (privacy, 
entertainment, and culture) are, however, not fully examined and evaluated. 
Since the historical  debates have frequently regarded movement to an urban 
residence as a negative factor, Williamson’s test of the factors in the urban-rural 
wage differential does point to procedures useful to those who wish to adjust 
national income estimates rather than keep various components of welfare sep- 
arate for disc~ssions.~~ 
In addition to the complexities of estimating measured income, the interpre- 
tation of changes in measured income as demonstrating changes in welfare has 
a number of other important problems. While prices can be a measure of rela- 
tive marginal scarcity, they need not reflect the full benefits of a priced good 
or the value of an unpriced one to consumers. The Smithian evaluation prob- 
33. See, e.g.,  the calculation by  Kuznets (1952, 63-69)  and Nordhaus and Tobin (1973). who 
discuss some of the complexities involved in these imputations. See also Usher (1980, 135-47). 
34. The subsequent exchange between Pollard and Williamson points to some of the problems 
in trying to evaluate these issues, such as the various problems in determining causes of death and 
in getting better measures of  what influences worker decisions. 
35. Other measures of the cost of “disamenities of urbanization” are based on regressions in- 
cluding population density in trying to explain differentials in income. See Nordhaus and Tobin 
(1973) and, for a later discussion of this set of issues, Roback (1982). Kuznets (1952, 60-62)  used 
estimated price differentials by city size to adjust for costs of  increased urbanization. 30  Stanley L. Engerman 
lem posed by the diamond-water paradox and also Lord Lauderdale’s distinc- 
tion of public wealth and individual riches, based on property ownership, re- 
flect complications  in the use of  market price~.~~  The use of  market prices 
based  on transactions with  some specific distribution of  income was ques- 
tioned by Wicksteed (1910,649-59),  who argued that redistribution of income 
could change market evaluations, a point that was central to the discussion of 
welfare economics criteria in the 1940s and  1950s. The discussion of  prices 
and their meaning thus raises issues as to whether these prices contain all de- 
sired welfare information and also, more simply, as to what might be regarded 
as the appropriate set of weights to be applied when aggregating individual 
outputs into national income totals. 
A related problem, one early noted  as a paradox by  Pigou, was that “the 
frequent desecration of natural  beauty through  the hunt for coal or gold, or 
through the more blatant forms of commercial  advertisement, must,  on our 
definition,  leave the  national  dividend  intact”  (1929, 33). Important  issues 
about the most appropriate treatment of the depletion of natural resources and 
of pollution have recently been raised. Unpriced pollution and other disameni- 
ties serve to raise questions about the precise meaning of current income mea- 
sures, as based on estimates of their costs by Roback (1982) and Nordhaus and 
Tobin (1973). Such resource depletion and pollution  can both influence our 
beliefs regarding current levels of  income (welfare) and affect prospects for 
future economic growth. Further, whether differences in current levels of in- 
come provide the best forecast of differences in future levels of income, even 
when allowing for differential levels of  investment, public and private, is not 
easy to evaluate, particularly  given the uncertainty of exogenous changes in 
the economic environment and of the economy’s ability to respond to them.” 
Working in a direction opposite to these costs of growth are some benefits 
of growth that are either unpriced or priced at an inappropriate level. Benefits 
such as clean water, a healthier atmosphere, and safer transportation are often 
not priced, while the nature of quality changes in existing goods or the intro- 
duction of new goods (which are at times functionally equivalent to existing 
products) means that there are benefits that are usually undervalued when en- 
tered into the national income accounts. Given the magnitude of such new and 
improved goods in the process of  economic growth, it is expected that this 
factor will cause some understatement of long-term economic growth and its 
contribution to welfare.38 
36. Smith (1976, 44-45)  made a distinction between “value in use” and “value in exchange” 
and claimed that “the things which have the greatest value in use have little or no value in ex- 
change,” and vice versa. Lauderdale (1819, 39-110)  commented, “the wealth of the nation, and 
the mass of individual riches, cannot be regarded in every respect the same” (45). 
37. Such difficulties in linking present and future measures exist, of course, for any particular 
measure chosen. This can be seen, e.g., by  the comparisons of Irish and English heights before 
the Irish Famine, and by the discussion of the effects of wars on various economies. 
38. For a recent discussion of this issue, applied mainly to producer and consumer durables, see 
Gordon (1990). 31  The Standard of Living Debate in International Perspective 
The distinction between final goods and intermediate goods has also long 
presented difficulties of both theory and measurement. The conceptual distinc- 
tion between final output in a slave and that in a free society, noted by Seaman, 
has  been  further  discussed  recently. More  generally, however,  as Kuznets 
pointed out, the costs to a free individual of earning his or her living, including 
the necessary food input and clothing costs, could be considered intermediate 
inputs into the economic system in redefining final outputs, although Kuznets 
concluded by rejecting this because he regarded human wants as the basic end 
of  the system (Kuznets  1941, 36-45;  Studenski 1958, 188-94).39 More re- 
cently, John Wallis and Douglass North (1986) estimated the magnitude of the 
increased transactions costs of doing business in a modem economy, arguing 
that much of the output of the service sector should more reasonably be re- 
garded as intermediate not final outputs.'+O  Variations on this problem were in- 
vestigated in detail by Kuznets in a comparison of national incomes in China 
and in the United States, as well as in his examination of the role of the govern- 
ment sector in the economy (Kuznets 1941, 31-36;  1953, 145-91;  Studenski 
The philosophical complexities of treating what have been called "regretta- 
ble necessities" in national income comparisons have also long been discussed. 
Some of these reflect, in part, the impact of climatic and other forces on needs 
and relative evaluations.'" There are also items of expenditure, such as for war 
or defense, that do not directly provide welfare as usually argued but do play 
a crucial role (as do what we call intermediate goods) in offsetting what might 
otherwise have been more difficult individual or societal circumstances. 
1958,194-204). 
1.5  Alternative Concepts of Welfare 
Because of these many different problems, as well as others not mentioned, 
such as the general index number (and quality difference) problems in making 
international  comparisons  and comparisons over time,  some dissatisfaction 
with measures of national income has emerged. This has led to the search for 
alternative indicators to be used to evaluate economic change. Such measures 
are generally based on some available social and economic indicators that, it 
is argued, are related somewhat more directly to economic welfare, as either 
cause or consequence, than a single national income estimate. The League of 
Nations and its International Labor Office focused on studies of the importance 
39. Various other measured consumption components, such as education, health care, and mi- 
gration, may also be regarded as forms of investment, with additions for their opportunity costs, 
including time. 
40. See also the discussion of  this paper by Lance Davis. 
41. Usher (1968) provided a detailed recompution of  national income differentials between 
Thailand and the United Kingdom based primarily on price differences in the two economies. As 
is well known, for international comparisons of  income it can make a considerable difference 
depending upon which price indexes are used for the examination. 32  Stanley L. Engerman 
of nutrition in the 1930~.~~  In the 1940s and 1950s the search for nonmonetary 
measures was pursued by various economists in the United States and else- 
where, as well as by several United Nations commissions.43  Bennett (195 l),  for 
example, used 16 nonmonetary measures of relative consumption to compare 
nations,  achieving a single index by  an arbitrary  weighting scheme applied 
to relative data. The UN study listed considerably more items, rejecting the 
usefulness of national income for welfare measures since “no type of monetary 
index as a general international measure of levels of living could be recom- 
mended” (United Nations 1954, vi). They did not, however, provide any theo- 
retical resolution of what measures to include, or of  how to weight items in 
order to obtain a single index to be used for comparative purposes. Such list- 
ings of items have long been used, often to supplement income comparisons, 
and to indicate what economic growth has meant, without necessarily  being 
seen as a replacement for income estimates. As presented by Stanley Lebergott 
(1976, 1993), for example, their principal purpose has been to bring out the 
dramatic changes meant by economic growth, which are highlighted by giving 
attention to the creation and diffusion of  some specific items (see also U.S. 
Department of Labor, n.d.). 
One of  the  major  characteristics  of  economic  growth  has  been  constant 
change in the structure of the economy, due to shifting patterns of consumption 
and production. Changes in consumption patterns are best described by Engel’s 
law, which gives the expected variation in expenditure patterns with changes 
in income, whether over time or in a cross section (see, e.g., Kuznets 1966, 
262-84).  Perhaps the most firmly supported part of Engel’s law is that as in- 
come rises, the share of consumption expenditures on food declines, even as 
the absolute amount expended continues to rise. Applied to nations this would 
mean that estimates of growth based only on food consumption will understate 
the rate of economic growth, at least as compared with the rate estimated from 
conventional national income accounts. Since it is expected that height will 
increase with increased food consumption, not increased total consumption, it 
is anticipated that as income and consumption increase height should increase 
less  than  proportionately.  If  income  elasticities  for food  consumption  are 
known, however, growth in income can be estimated from growth in food con- 
sumption. It would seem, then, that income is the preferred index, with food 
42. See, e.g., League of Nations (1937) and International Labor Office (1936). The League of 
Nations report used conscription data for northern and Western Europe to argue that “there was 
undoubtedly an increase in stature” (25-26).  These increases were Sweden (1840-1926)  8 cm, 
Denmark(1840-1913)  8 cm, Norway (1800-1900)  IOcm, and the Netherlands (1850-1907) about 
5 inches. It mentioned that similar results were observed for “male and female students at Amen- 
can universities.” They attributed some of this to increased outputs, particularly of food. They then 
tried to disentangle the effects of “the economic and medical” factors in this change in health and 
concluded, based on comparisons of timing, that it was the economic forces that played a “perhaps 
dominant role.” 
43.  See, e.g.,  Bennett (1937, 1951). Davis (1943, and United Nations (1954). Some earlier 
discussions of the issue of standards and their measurement can be found in Zimrnerman (1936), 
Eliot (1931), and works cited in Lamale (1958). 33  The Standard of Living Debate in International Perspective 
consumption used primarily as a proxy for the desired measure, not itself being 
the welfare concept. 
1.6  New Indexes of Welfare 
More recently, several attempts at simpler composite measures with fewer, 
but hopefully more essential, categories have been made. One such index, pre- 
sented by Morris D. Moms in  1979, the Physical  Quality of Life Index, is 
based on three measures: infant mortality, life expectancy at age one, and liter- 
acy rates. These variables all have reasonable, but not perfect, correlations with 
levels of national income. Moms detailed his procedures  of calculation  and 
weighting,  but the weighting is, as it must be,  somewhat arbitrary.  Starting 
with its 1990 Human Development Report, the United Nations has prepared a 
Human Development Index (HDI) as a “contribution” to the search “for a bet- 
ter, more comprehensive socio-economic measure” (United Nations Develop- 
ment Programme  1994). It is described as “an alternative to GNP for measur- 
ing the relative socio-economic progress of nations. It enables people and their 
governments to evaluate progress over time-and  to determine priorities for 
policy intervention. It also permits instructive comparisons of the experiences 
in different countries.” As the authors indicate, both the contents and the meth- 
ods of calculating the HDI have been adjusted, and estimates for various sub- 
groups as well as for the nation have been introduced. The basic variables that 
went into HDI estimates in  1994 were life expectancy, adult literacy, mean 
years of schooling, and real GDP per capita. The principle underlying the com- 
bination of these different concepts is to provide a common measuring rod for 
“the socio-economic  distance travelled,” based on “a minimum  and a maxi- 
mum for each dimension.” The concept of the HDI was extended in a study by 
Partha Dasgupta (1993,  108-16)  to include measures of both political rights 
and civil rights, in order to provide an “inter-country comparison of the quality 
of life.” Unlike the United Nations, however, Dasgupta presented his summary 
rankings in ordinal, not cardinal, form. For all listed countries, the correlation 
of rankings between this index and per capita income are reasonable but not 
perfect, but the breakdown into developed nations in contrast with developing 
nations is basically the same. What additional guides this measure provides for 
the planning of policy that are not also given by GNP (and its related indexes) 
is not clear, except perhaps that it encourages a focus on making improvements 
primarily in regard to the specific variables that go into the index. 
The discussion thus far has focused on the measurement of  aggregate na- 
tional income averaged over the population and on various indexes of the qual- 
ity of life. Such measures say nothing about the distribution of income among 
members of society, nor about how the distribution of income changed over 
time with the process of economic growth. Kuznets suggested a U-shaped rela- 
tion between income equality and economic growth, with inequality increas- 
ing in the early stage of economic expansion  and then declining  as growth 34  Stanley L. Engerman 
proceeds.44  While others have found this pattern to be widespread, the overall 
shape of the income distribution as well as the actual changes for each particu- 
lar individual or family seem to follow no obvious pattern. As the debates on 
welfare criteria have shown, comparisons of two situations are difficult when 
it cannot be argued that each and every individual has been made better off 
absolutely (here putting aside those issues arising when there are interdepen- 
dent utilities and when utilities are based on relative positions), and when no 
real-world compensation of losers by gainers can be undertaken. Presumably, 
however, this type of distributional problem exists for any attempt at a single 
index, unless we believe with certainty that the underlying distribution around 
that average number is known and can be related to changes in the mean. 
1.7  Heights as a Welfare Measure 
In the past two decades there has been considerable work, as this volume 
demonstrates, using another index of economic change to describe the histori- 
cal past-heights  of individuals at specified ages.45  This approach to social 
and economic change has long been known and utilized, as James Tanner has 
amply demonstrated, and the use of height as a measure of  well-being, with 
information about heights frequently coming from military data, has been un- 
dertaken in many Continental countries. Height is an attractive measure since 
it was used as a primary source for the identification and recognition of indi- 
viduals. Moreover, in the case of the military, reported height was the result of 
direct measurement under quite specific conditions. A wide variety of sources 
going back for long periods-farther  back than the data required to prepare 
systematic estimates of  national income-have  been found that contain data 
on heights, such as military records, shipping records for convicts, slaves, and 
indentured servants, criminal records, runaway slave advertisements, slave reg- 
istrations, school records, and records of public and private agencies. While 
military records have been almost exclusively for males of adult or near adult 
age, other sources have permitted estimation of heights for women and chil- 
dren. In addition to achieved adult heights, it has been possible to measure 
rates of change in heights at preadult ages, and to make comparisons not only 
for one country over time but also for different nations. Further, this has led to 
44. On  trends in income distribution, see also Williamson (1991) and Adelman and Monis 
(1973). At issue is not only the distribution at any moment of time but also the changes in the 
relative and absolute positions of various individuals and generations over time, the question of 
social mobility. For an examination of some early measures in the United States of the distribution 
of wealth and income by size, see Menvin (1939). and the discussion by  Kuznets. 
45. Because of the focus of  this volume, I will not provide a more complete set of citations but 
will restrict myself mainly to general observations. For discussions of  the study of  heights in 
history and by economic historians, see Tanner (1981),  Harris (1994). Fogel (1986.1993). Komlos 
(1994, 1995), Floud, Wachter, and Gregory (1990). and Steckel(l992); see also Kunitz (1987). 35  The Standard of Living Debate in International Perspective 
some expansion in the use of physical measures to describe well-being, includ- 
ing data on birthweights, reflecting  maternal  conditions, and the body mass 
index (BMI), a composite measure of the present height and weight of indi- 
viduals.4h 
Given the  widely  discussed and  often believed  expected  relationship be- 
tween height and nutrition, and the relationship between nutritional input and 
per capita income, and given that usable height data exist for times and places 
where  reliable  national  income  estimates  are  not  available,  it  was  initially 
thought that heights could serve as a useful proxy for income in those cases 
where  no estimates of the latter had  been  presented.  The initial studies of 
heights suggested a quite reasonable correlation between heights and income, 
both when dealing with growth in one country and when comparing different 
countries during similar time periods. These early studies had to deal with two 
major problems, one statistical, one conceptual. Because of the importance of 
military data, and the facts that the military did not accept everyone who was 
examined, for health  and other reasons, and that its standards of acceptable 
height  and health  varied over time (often in  response to greater manpower 
needs in wartime), means of determining statistical truncation points and the 
number of applicants who were eliminated because of truncation were needed. 
Clearly, the measured heights of those entering the army could present a mis- 
leading picture of the heights of the overall population of adult men, and this 
led to  some difficulties  in  interpretation  in  the  past.  Two procedures,  both 
premised on there being a normal distribution of the relevant group (however 
this group is defined), were devised and discussed in a study by James Trussell 
and Kenneth Wachter (Wachter and Trussell  1982). These adjustments com- 
pensated for the effects of various  minimum and maximum height require- 
ments and of their change over time. These improved measures were, never- 
theless,  subject to  discussions  and  controversies  about  their  relevance  and 
accuracy. 
Second, since there are calls on nutritional input for work and other activi- 
ties, and thus nutritional requirements vary with work effort and intensity of 
input, the relevant  concept to describe the expected  impact of  nutrition  on 
height is not gross nutrition, the input of foodstuffs, but rather net nutrition- 
net of work and other requirements.  Height measures, unlike measures of na- 
tional income, can thus  allow for the disutility of increased work intensity. 
Further, in going from gross nutrition to net nutrition the role of disease is of 
obvious importance, both in causing an increase in the nutritional input needed 
to maintain health and also as an element determining the efficiency in con- 
verting energy from food input into physical growth. 
46. For studies of birthweights, see Goldin and Margo (1989) and Ward (1993). Studies of BMI 
by economic historians are discussed in Fogel (1993). While these can supplement the information 
provided by heights, many of the issues discussed below also apply to them. 36  Stanley L. Engerman 
Since the earlier studies seemed to demonstrate a high correlation between 
height and income, and their change, as well as between height and mortality, 
measures of height and of income were seen to be complementary rather than 
competitive. It was, however, with subsequent studies that provided height esti- 
mates for periods in which national income estimates existed that some im- 
portant and interesting differences arose. In many different places, there were 
seen to be cycles, with expansions and downturns, in the patterns  of  height 
change, not the basically upward linear trend found for incomes and expected 
to have occurred for heights as well. While expectations regarding heights 
seem to be better met for cross-sectional comparisons both within and across 
countries, with the expected class differences within nations generally to be 
found, it was in the measurement of economic growth over time that problems 
arose and the nature of interpretation became more difficult. Given the desire 
for a unique answer to a question, initial responses in dealing with these differ- 
ent measures were more often to argue a preference for one or the other of the 
measures as dealing with the most important welfare concept, rather than to 
aim at resolving the apparent paradox by reconciling what were possibly mea- 
sures of different concepts. In some cases there seemed to be a possible recon- 
ciliation of measures going in different directions. Possibly, for example, there 
was some reduced food input in agricultural regions newly opened to trade as 
part of the economic growth process, or increased income may have meant that 
food consumption shifted to varieties of food that were more processed  and 
had, per dollar of expenditure, less nutrient value. These possibilities have been 
mentioned as different means of reconciling increased incomes and decreased 
heights, even if it leaves open the welfare implications. Similarly, it has been 
claimed that new  disease environments, whether exogenous or endogenous, 
imposed costs on society that were not reflected in national incomes, a situa- 
tion that again could lead to increased incomes and decreased heights. On the 
other hand, as the example of public health measures suggests, it is possible 
that gains (or losses) in mortality  experience occur without any major, direct 
changes in individual incomes. Thus reconciliations have been suggested be- 
tween changes in heights and in incomes in different directions or of different 
orders of magnitude, although disagreement persists on how best to answer the 
question of whether people were better or worse off. 
The difficulties in measuring national income are well known and have long 
been discussed and debated, as pointed out above. The concept of  national 
income has survived much of this criticism and is still in general use, pitfalls 
and all. What I want to do now is to raise certain conceptual issues about the 
use of  height measures, which deal with the interpretation of  findings from 
empirical studies, leaving aside the various issues of appropriate measurement 
and of correction for known biases. While it is clear that studies of changing 
heights have made and will continue to make a major contribution to the study 
of economic history, to take full advantage of their promise certain pieces of 
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1.8  Factors in Human Physical Growth 
One problem whose importance for the study of heights has become clear 
only relatively  recently  concerns the precise nature of diseases, their causes 
and their consequences. It is obvious that certain diseases can influence physi- 
cal growth patterns of individuals. Since  these diseases may influence individu- 
als at different ages, with generally the greatest impact at ages from birth to 
age two, it may be necessary to consider the full sequence of the growth path 
in order to determine the conditions that permit “catch-up” growth to occur or 
to see whether the losses suffered are permanent. Interacting with disease in 
influencing infant growth could be changes in breast-feeding practices,  with 
some direct effects on nutrition as well as on disease susceptibility. 
Diseases  can result from human  behavior  (e.g., from migration  or from 
health and cleanliness habits), as well as being generated by the natural envi- 
ronment (e.g., climatic changes, hurricanes, earthquakes, and insect and ani- 
mal population changes). Disease may be the outcome of the process of eco- 
nomic  change,  or  it  can  be  independent  of  the  economic  situation.  More 
plausibly, perhaps, there is some degree of interaction between the two. Since 
disease will influence the relation  between food input and achieved height, 
changes in the disease environment that affect stature can mean that height 
changes are not to be regarded as the direct result of changes in nutrition. The 
worsening of the disease environment, for any reason, can reduce the achieved 
height consistent with any level of national income, although the interpretation 
of the welfare significance of such a height reduction will vary depending on 
whether the cause of the disease change is endogenous or exogenous to the 
economic growth process. Thus more information on the nature and causes of 
diseases, and on their influence on the relationship of foodstuffs to height, will 
help us to better understand the process and evaluation of economic change. 
Comparisons between changes in national income and changes in height are 
often difficult because there remains uncertainty as to the precise period of 
time to which to attribute the causes of  height variations,  while the specific 
year for which national income is measured is clearly known. Explanations of 
the nature and timing of some specific events leading to height changes often 
suggest the existence of a long and varying lag, so that contemporaneous com- 
parisons  of  heights  and  incomes  will  be  misleading.  The relative  role  of 
birthweight (and maternal influences) and of various ages prior to, during, and 
after growth  spurts have been frequently discussed but,  as noted, with little 
apparent certainty at present as to critical periods of impact. Physiological im- 
pacts may vary with individual age and with time of changes, so that the value 
of indicators will vary depending on whether our primary interest is in long- 
term trends or in shorter periods, including business cycles. Short-term move- 
ments, including famines, may not be as sensitively or as accurately measured 
by heights as by national incomes, nor may height data show up rapidly enough 
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Related to this issue of physical growth patterns is the question of  what is 
precisely known about the relationship between food input and height: Is it 
linear or nonlinear? Are there threshold levels at either the short or the tall end? 
The conversion of income into height may also depend on level of education, 
which can influence the efficiency of  the individual’s diet selection and food 
preparation. These pieces of information will be useful for several questions, 
including that of the expected relationship between income and height at dif- 
ferent levels of food input, and the relationship between the distribution of 
heights and the distribution of incomes and food inputs. Further,  it may be 
important to distinguish among the impacts of different foodstuffs in adding 
to physical  growth potential, a distinction that  suggests that the relation  of 
income, food input, and height may be considerably more varied than earlier 
anticipated. Given the impact of Engel’s law over time and across income levels 
at a moment of time, the translation between relative heights and relative in- 
comes is frequently not obvious. 
The persistence  of  the  pattern  of  higher  mortality  for  those  of  smaller 
heights can also present certain problems in the interpretation of changes over 
time. There will be some measured increase in average height over time since 
in general those who die tend to have been shorter than the average (see, e.g., 
Friedman 1982). And as overall mortality declines over time there could be a 
small tendency for average heights to fall since there will now be more survi- 
vors of below average height. Whether these points are of any quantitative sig- 
nificance awaits more data on patterns of mortality and mortality change attrib- 
utable to factors related to height. 
1.9  Concluding Reflections 
It remains difficult to find any one measure or index that can provide us with 
all we wish to know about the magnitude of  welfare and its distribution, as 
well as their changes over time. None of the indicators seem to always provide 
the expected answers, either over time or across countries. We have a number 
of imperfect indicators, and while there are often adjustments that can be made 
to better approximate our goal, these will often leave many issues open. Dis- 
agreements on interpretations exist for numerous reasons, including a failure 
to agree on the proper set of  weights for calculating indexes based on more 
than one component, and in the desire to go beyond ordinal rankings to get 
cardinal differences, attempted so that we can discuss orders-of-magnitude dif- 
ferentials across classes and nations. And for each possible indicator it is neces- 
sary to determine the proportionality between the index and the welfare we are 
attempting to measure, and to determine if  the components of the index rise 
equally with what we regard as welfare over time. 
Some attempts to go beyond the basic economic indicators have led to inter- 
est in so-called social indicators, which include various measures of social ills 39  The Standard of Living Debate in International Perspective 
and social bette~ment.~’  As with other nonmonetary indicators, however, there 
are no schemes of weighting to provide an unambiguous single-number index. 
Some scholars have utilized  questionnaires,  asking  people about  their  per- 
ceived happiness  and well-being.  In an  analysis  of  such questionnaires  by 
Richard Easterlin, it appears that the results do suggest that individuals, in any 
nation, with above average income feel better than those whose incomes fall 
below  average, but  there  seem to be no major increases  in happiness  with 
growth of income over time (Easterlin 1974; see also Campbell, Converse, and 
Rodgers,  1976). However interesting these surveys, they present many basic 
difficulties-some  peculiar  to  the  method,  including  understanding  what 
makes for individual evaluations, as well as some similar to those of other mea- 
sures. 
The difficulty in choosing among indicators or in somehow combining them 
reflects two different types of problems. One concerns the possibility and the 
costs of obtaining the data necessary to appropriately measure the desired con- 
cept. Do the data exist, presumably as a result of some other functions within 
society, and are they easily translatable into the concept of interest, either di- 
rectly or with some suitable adjustments? Or if new data are required, can they 
be obtained at low enough cost? Second, how can we relate any of the mea- 
sures to some basic underlying economic model? Which measures can be ar- 
gued to be the direct outcome of maximizing behavior, and which are more the 
by-products of individual behavior that had sought other goals? Such issues 
are difficult to argue about since, while we might believe that individuals max- 
imize  utility, not  measured  income,  life expectation,  food consumption,  or 
height, it is not clear how to determine what enters into different individual 
utility functions. Given the difficulties in finding an answer to any basic ques- 
tion of differential welfare, perhaps our best strategy is to accept the specific 
value of particular indicators for answering particular questions but also re- 
main  aware of the complexity  of  the multitude  of  factors  that  makes these 
examinations so difficult and generalization so uncertain. 
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